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CLIMATE CHANGE, CULTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION, AND 
COMPREHENSIVE RATIONALITY 
DOUGLAS A. KVSAR* 
Abstract: Economic cost-benefit analysis aims to evaluate regulatory pro-
posals by identifying, monetizing, and comparing the proposals' expected 
positive and negative consequences. The methodology has been received 
critically in the area of environmental, health, and safety regulation, where 
scientific uncertainty, difficulties of valuation, and uncommonly long time 
horizons are said to render cost-benefit analysis especially problematic. This 
Essay reviews such criticisms through a discussion of the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in the particular context of climate change policymaking. In this 
context, generic criticisms of cost-benefit analysis in the environmental, 
health, and safety area become even more pronounced, raising significant 
doubt about the methodology's philosophical and practical appropriate-
ness as a guide for climate change. 
In a remarkably clear, candid, and courageous new book, James 
Gustave Speth documents both the continued deterioration of the 
global environment and the failure of the international community to 
respond forcefully and effectively to that deterioration.! As the cur-
rent dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, a 
founder of the World Resources Institute and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, an advisor on environmental issues to Presidents 
Carter and Clinton, and a former chief executive officer of the United 
Nations Development Programme, Speth brings considerable experi-
ence and authority to the account. His views reflect the seasoned 
gravitas of one who has been intimately involved with the modern en-
vironmental movement since its inception and who, despite having' 
played a leading role in many of its successes and accomplishments, 
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. J.D., Harvard University, 1998; B.A, 
Indiana University, 1995. This Essay is an edited version of invited remarks on climate 
change and cost-benefit analysis that were given at the Economic Dynamics of Environ-
mental Law and Static Efficiency Conference held at Syracuse University, College of Law, 
on October 10-11, 2003. For helpful and stimulating discussion, I thank the conference 
participants and especially David Driesen, the conference organizer, as well as my col-
league, Kevin Clermont. 
1 See generally JAMES GUSTAVE SPETII, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND TIlE CRISIS 
OF TIlE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (2004). 
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knows well the movement's failures and limitations.2 Accordingly, 
when Speth concludes that "[t]he current system of international ef-
forts to help the environment simply isn't working,"3 we should listen 
carefully both to his diagnosis and to his prescription for change. 
As Speth notes, most of the underlying causes of unsustainable 
and inequitable development patterns are readily identifiable,4 as are 
the policy measures necessary to address them.5 What is missing, in 
Speth's view, is not adequate knowledge of our problems and their 
potential solutions, but rather a common environmental conscious-
ness that regards other nations, other generations, and other life 
forms with sufficient awareness and concern to vault environmental 
solutions to the forefront of the global agenda. Accordingly, Speth 
believes that an entirely new model of global environmental govern-
ance is required, one in which international obligations flow not from 
the empty platitudes of treaties that lack political and institutional 
support,6 but rather from a fundamentally transformed culture that 
views environmental sustain ability and global equity as moral impera-
tives to be implemented through dynamic local, regional, and non-
governmental initiatives, as well as through a well-funded and well-
respected World Environmental Organization.7 
2 The term "environmental movement" here is used with some measure of hesitation, 
for, as Speth notes, we have yet to witness an engagement of citizens that is sufficiently 
broad and serious to merit the term. "We have had movements against slavery and many 
have participated in movements for civil rights and against apartheid and the Vietnam 
War. Environmentalists are often said to be part of 'the environmental movement.' We 
need a real one." [d. at 197. 
3 [d. at xii. 
4 See id. at 119-47 (identifying ten "proximate or immediate drivers of large-scale envi-
ronmen tal deterioration"). 
5 See id. at 151-71 (advocating "proven approaches" to stabilizing population growth, 
an invigorated commitment to aiding development of impoverished nations, measures to 
stimulate development of environmentally benign technologies, economic policy instru-
ments that would help to internalize the cost of environmental externalities, product mar-
ket reforms that would help to downstream environmental information to consumers, and 
"larger investments in scientific and environmental literacy"). 
6 See id. at 98-116 (concluding that current approaches to international environmental 
governance are characterized by "weak multilateral institutions" and "toothless treaties," 
and arguing that "the lion's share of the blame must go to the wealthy, industrial countries 
and especially to the United States, which ... has not accorded global-scale environmental 
challenges the priority needed to elicit determined, effective responses"). 
7 See id. at 172-201 (describing ways to encourage local, decentralized efforts to im-
prove industrial and household consumer environmental impact, as well as to reform the 
institutions and practices of global environmental governance). 
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This Essay supports Speth's case through a discussion of climate 
change, cultural transformation, and comprehensive rationality.8 Nar-
rowly, it critiques the use of one aspirant to comprehensive rationality, 
economic cost-benefit analysis (CBA), in the context of climate change 
policymaking. More broadly, it describes a manner of evaluating hu-
man activities and policy choices that impedes, in deep and subtle ways, 
the type of cultural transformation that Speth regards as necessary to 
the continued vitality and development of humanity and its environ-
ment. As will be explained, "the two central ideas of environmental eth-
ics" that Speth argues must be embraced as part of our re-envisioning 
of ourselves and our relationship to the natural world-namely, "the 
protection for their own sake of the living communities that evolved 
here with us," and "our trusteeship of the earth's natural wealth and 
beauty for generations to come"9-both are denied or discounted by 
the methodological assumptions of CBA. It follows, then, that if one 
agrees with the central argument of Speth's new book, one should be 
troubled by the use of CBA in climate change policymaking. 
To be clear, this Essay does not challenge efforts to identify the ex-
pected consequences of climate change or of proposals to mitigate or 
adapt to climate change. There are obvious and sound reasons for 
wanting to know, with as much precision as is feasible at a given mo-
ment, what the likely positive and negative effects of engaging in a par-
ticular course of action are in response to an impending problem. Nor 
does this Essay oppose the implementation of particular climate 
change policy goals through the use of economic instruments such as 
tradable permits or pollution taxes.l° There are, again, obvious and 
sound reasons for wanting to achieve a specified goal with as little social 
cost as possible. If economic policy instruments truly are more cost-
effective than traditional regulatory tools, as their proponents argue, 
then there is little reason in principle to oppose them. What this Essay 
disputes instead is the use of CBA to determine the content of climate 
change policy goals, rather than merely the method by which those 
goals are implemented. It is in this sense that CBA threatens to impede 
8 By "comprehensive rationality,· this Essay refers to a mode of policymaking that as-
pires to offer precise, exhaustive, and objective analysis of government efforts to achieve 
identified goals--an approach that Colin Diver referred to as the "synoptic model.· See 
Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 396-99 
(1981). 
9 SPETH, supra note 1, at 192. 
10 For discussion of an economic policy instrument designed to be sensitive both to 
implementation costs and to political realities, see WarwickJ. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilco-
xen, The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy, 16J. ECON. PERSP. 107 (2002). 
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the transformation of culture that Speth and others regard as vital to 
the future of the planet. 
Part I of this Essay offers a very brief introduction to the use of 
CBA in climate change policymaking, utilizing controversial environ-
mental commentator Bj0rn Lomborg's study as an illustrative example 
of the methodology and the type of policy conclusions that it is capable 
of generating. Part II then discusses four key limitations of the use of 
CBA in the climate change context: (1) the inconsistency between 
CBA's problem-state assumptions and the actual level and nature of 
uncertainty surrounding climate change; (2) the inability of the valua-
tion methodologies utilized by CBA practitioners to consider appropri-
ately the anticipated losses of human life and environmental resources; 
(3) the impropriety of using exponential discounting within CBA to 
resolve decisions regarding the intertemporal distribution of costs and 
benefits; and (4) the inherent orientation of CBA toward the status 
quo, or what David Driesen would call its static, rather than dynamic, 
efficiency orientation. l1 Together, these limitations suggest that CBA is 
an unacceptably crude device for guiding policy choices in the context 
of a massively complex and morally imbued problem such as global 
climate change. 
It bears emphasizing at the outset that most of the critiques lev-
ied in this Essay are not original. Rather, they come from careful 
thinkers who have examined and challenged the use of CBA in envi-
ronmental, health, and safety decisionmaking more generally, includ-
ing Elizabeth Anderson,12 Derek Parfit,13 Mark Sagoff,14 and Lisa 
Heinzerling,15 Their points are worth restating here, however, for at 
least two reasons: first, because they apply with particular force in the 
climate change context and, second, because no matter how thought-
ful and well-reasoned the critiques may have been when first offered, 
11 DAVID DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4 (2003). 
12 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). 
13 See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). 
14 See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988). 
15 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 
YALE LJ. 1911 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 
39 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. LJ. 2025 
(1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. LJ. 2311 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, 
Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 459 (1997); Lisa Heinzerling, Regula-
tory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ. 1981 (1998) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Regula-
tory Costs]; Lisa Heinzerling, The Perils of Precision, 15 ENVTL. F. 38 (1998); Lisa Heinzerling, 
The Rights of StatisticalPeopk, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 189 (2000). 
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they seem not to have slowed the drive toward a "cost-benefit state. "16 
Indeed, with international action on climate change currently being 
thwarted by the United States at least in part due to arguments prem-
ised on CBA,17 one sensibly might ask whether we are headed toward 
not just a cost-benefit state, but a cost-benefit globe. If so, then as this 
Essay will explain, Speth's hope for the emergence and assertion of a 
"new consciousness"18 may face legal and intellectual impediments 
that are even stronger than he fears. 
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES: 
A BRIEF EXAMPLE 
Climate change implicates the economic, social, cultural, and relig-
ious practices of all people in all regions of the world. Broadly speaking, 
it challenges both the established patterns of living, moving, eating, and 
consuming that prevail in the developed world and the aspirations of 
the developing world to achieve the same.19 More specifically, climate 
change emphasizes the need to shift to a decarbonized energy infra-
structure at some point in time well before humanity otherwise would 
tap and combust the last remaining oil and coal reserves. Following the 
most recent suite of consensus scientific and economic reports from 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),20 few seri-
ously question this need. Debate instead focuses primarily on issues of 
timing and the degree and nature of government involvement that is 
desirable in order to bring about the requisite transformation. 
In Speth's view, the necessary changes can occur on a global level 
only with the active leadership of the United States: "Not only are we 
Americans a big source of problems (as with climate change), but we 
are also essential to cooperative solutions .... The world needs a 
United States that leads by example and diplomacy, with generosity 
and compassion. "21 Unfortunately, with the exception of its appropri-
ately lauded role in the effort to protect and restore the earth's ozone 
16 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, at ix (2002) ("Gradually, and in fits 
and starts, American government is becoming a cost-benefit state."). 
17 See SPE'IH, supra note 1, at 62-63. 
18 [d. at 196. 
19 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 589 
(2d ed. 2002) ("Climate change looms as a defining issue of the 21st century, because it 
pits the potential disruption of the global climate system against the future of a fossil fuel-
based economy. "). 
20 IPCC reports are available online at http://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm (last visited Mar. 
5,2004). 
21 SPE'IH, sttpra note 1, at 201. 
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layer, Speth believes that the United States has "dragged its feet on 
just about every international environmental treaty that has been sug-
gested. "22 In the climate change context, the most dramatic illustra-
tion of such recalcitrance occurred when the U.S. Senate passed, by a 
vote of 95-0, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which voiced objection to 
any climate treaty that did not include binding emissions targets for 
developing nations on the same schedule as developed nations.23 
Faced with such domestic resistance, the Clinton Administration ac-
complished little in the way of actual progress toward reaching the 
emissions targets set by the international community in the Kyoto 
Protoco1.24 More recently, President George W. Bush's decisive with-
drawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol seemed to deride 
the very notion of international environmentallawmaking.25 
In deciding to abstain in this manner from multilateral discus-
sions concerning what many regard as the most important policy issue 
facing the world today, U.S. officials may have taken comfort from 
various economic analyses that purport to reveal the Kyoto Protocol 
to be a welfare-decreasing policy measure.26 Lomborg, for instance, 
has relied on climate changes studies by Yale economist William 
Nordhaus27 to conclude that "the total and long-term damages from 
22 Id. at xii. 
23 S. REp. No.1 05-54, at 4 (1997). The Senate declaration stood in direct contradiction of 
the so-called Berlin Mandate, whereby developed nation members of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the United States, agreed 
to commit to emissions reductions prior to the imposition of obligations on developing na-
tions. See UNFCCC, opened for signature June 4, 1992, art. 3.1, 31 I.L.M. 849, http://unfccc. 
int/resource/conv/conv_005.html ("[TJhe developed country Parties should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.") (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
24 See Amy Royden, U.S. Climate Change Policy Under Clinton: A Look Back, 32 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 415, 416-17, 477 (2002). 
25 CfJohn W. Head, What Has Not Changed Since September ll-The Benefits of Multilater-
alism, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y I, 3 (2002) (citing withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol 
among other administration actions as "aberrations from the general U.S. embrace of 
multilateral ism") . 
26 See, e.g., BJPRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE 
REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001) (applying cost-benefit analyses to various environ-
mental problems, including climate change). 
27 Nordhaus has played a leading role in the development of integrated assessment 
modeling of climate change, a methodology that aims to capture not only the physical 
effects of emissions scenarios, but also the socioeconomic effects. See William D. Nordhaus, 
An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse Gases, 258 SCI. 1315, 1315 (1992); see 
also WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLI-
MATE CHANGE 5 (1994); WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: 
ECONOMIC MODELING OF GLOBAL WARMING 5-7 (2000); William D. Nordhaus, Rolling the 
'DICE': An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling Greenhouse Gases, 15 RESOURCE & ENERGY 
ECON. 27, 28-29 (1993). 
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emitting an extra ton of carbon today is the equivalent of $7.5[0]. "28 
Weighed against the costs of cutting emissions, this figure implies that 
a "4 percent cut in 1995 [emissions levels] is the optimal carbon re-
duction for the globe,"29 a level far more modest than the Kyoto Pro-
tocol's aggregate cut of 5.2 percent below 1990 emissions levels.30 In-
deed, based on Nordhaus's calculations, Lomborg concludes that, 
"[d]espite our intuition that we naturally need to do something dras-
tic about ... global warming, economic analyses clearly show that it 
will be far more expensive to cut CO2 emission radically than to pay 
the costs of adaptation to the increased temperatures. "31 
Lomborg's language requires unpacking. At bottom, he is argu-
ing that the economic benefits of continued fossil-fuel combustion 
more than outweigh the human, physical, agricultural, and ecological 
costs that would be averted by restricting global greenhouse gas emis-
sions to the levels called for by the Kyoto Protocol. Viewed in the ag-
gregate, Lomborg asserts that the present value of all harms expected 
to be caused by the current level of emissions is $4820 billion.32 Ini-
tially, this may seem to be a staggering sum requiring swift and deci-
sive action, but Lomborg also claims that the optimal policy of emis-
sions reduction will cost $4575 billion to implement, thereby resulting 
in a net gain of only $245 billion.33 Any more stringent policy, moreo-
ver, will result in a net loss to society, as emissions reductions will have 
been undertaken at a cost greater than the harm that they avert.!l4 
Thus, Lomborg argues that the world will be best off if we restrict 
emissions merely to the level that is implied by adoption of the ideal 
carbon tax of$7.50 per ton.35 
Lomborg's study, which depends principally on work by Nordhaus, 
is only one example of CBA in the climate change context. As one 
28 LOMBORG, supra note 26, at 306. 
29 [d. 
:!O See id. at 302. Even Kyoto'S target cuts would produce only a modest reduction in 
warming trends, see id., an un surprising result given that Kyoto always has been viewed as 
simply the first step in what would become an ongoing process of international negotia-
tion and cooperation. See Eileen Claussen, Carping at Kyoto, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 
247,255 (2002) (book review) ("[The Kyoto Protocol's] initial targets for emissions reduc-
tions take us only to the 2008-2012 period, and they represent just a very small down pay-
ment on the level of emissions reductions that scientists say we must achieve in order to 
have a real effect on mitigating climate change."). 
51 LOMBORG, supra note 26, at 318. 
52 See id. at 310. 
55 See id. 
54 [d. at 311. 
55 See id. at 308. 
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might expect, results from other studies vary, sometimes considerably. 
For instance, estimates of the direct benefits of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions levels range from as little as $5 to as much as $125 per ton 
in 1990 U.S. dollars.36 Conversely, estimates of the price necessary in 
order to achieve the emissions targets of the Kyoto Protocol range from 
$20 to $400 per ton of carbon.37 Among the causes of such wide varia-
tion are the base level assumptions included in the models regarding 
population, economic growth, and anticipated future emissions lev-
els-all matters about which researchers legitimately may disagree.38 In 
addition, although Lomborg's figure includes only direct benefits, in-
creasing attention also is being paid to possible ancillary benefits pro-
duced by climate change policies such as the inciden tal reduction of 
other air pollutants through emissions abatement, including sulfur di-
oxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and particulates.39 
Current estimates of such benefits range up to an additional $20 per 
ton, in 1990 U.S. dollars.40 
In short, although CBA of climate change is widely conducted and 
at times influential, it nevertheless is capable of considerably divergent 
results even according to its own established practices. Moreover, as the 
next Part will explain, close inspection of the established practices of 
CBA gives rise to several more fundamental sources of concern regard-
ing the propriety of its use in the climate change context. 
II. FOUR LIMITATIONS 
The normative premise of CBA is that its use will lead society to 
maximize the efficiency with which it devotes resources to policy 
goals. When Lomborg claims to have identified the "optimal carbon 
reduction for the globe," he is claiming to have considered all perti-
nent consequences of emissions-induced climate change and to have 
identified the level of emissions abatement that is 'just right" for all 
concerned.41 In other words, he is claiming to have found not just an 
answer, but the answer to the climate change problem. Viewed in this 
36 See J.P. BRUCE ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 183 (1996). 
37 John P. Weyant, Economic Models: How They Work & Why Their Results Differ, in CLI-
MATE CHANGE: SCIENCE, STRATEGIES, & SOLUTIONS 193, 194 (Eileen Claussen et al. eds., 
2001). 
38 See id. at 195-96. 
39 See id. at 206. 
40 [d. 
41 LOMBORG, supra note 26, at 306--07. 
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light, CBA obviously constitutes a form of rationality in that it seeks to 
derive conclusions from the application of formal logical rules. 
Moreover, it aspires to be a form of comprehensive rationality in that 
it aims to countenance all consequences of climate change within a 
single rubric that is both consistent and complete.42 In theory, there-
fore, the results of CBA should afford no basis for serious objection or 
dissent, as all important considerations will have been identified, 
tabulated, and weighed in a manner that leads to the identification of 
a first-best social outcome. There will be particular winners and losers, 
of course, as costs and benefits are not necessarily distributed equita-
bly by policy interventions that are designed to maximize efficiency. 
But, according to proponents of CBA, any "disinterested observer" 
will conclude that CBA has led to the "right answer" in terms of ag-
gregate social welfare.43 Part II explains why this is not the case. 
A. Uncertainty 
The CBA methodology presumes by its very nature the availability 
of good data and understanding regarding the magnitude of physical 
and economic effects of various climate change scenarios, as well as the 
probability that those scenarios will occur. Yet uncertainty pervades, we 
might even say defines, the climate change problem.44 We are unsure 
how much of observed warming is attributable to greenhouse gas emis-
sions. We do not know with certainty what the size of the human popu-
lation will become over the next century. We do not know what the ref-
erence case of economic growth will be. We do not understand and 
42 Cf Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, GOdel, Kaplow, Shavell: Consistency and Completeness in So-
cial Decisionmaking, George Mason University School of Law, Law and Economics Working 
Paper Series 03-55, at 12-14 (2003), available at http://www.gmu.edu/departments/law/ 
faculty/papers/docs/03-55.pdf (last visited March 5,2004). As this author details, a system 
that aims to provide formal rules of analysis cannot, as a matter of mathematical logic, be 
both complete and consistent, assuming a certain level of complexity to the system. As 
noted above, see supra note 8, this Essay uses the term "comprehensive rationality" in a less 
technical sense to signify an evaluative approach in which proposed government actions 
are assessed according to criteria that are thought to be empirically precise, value-neutral, 
and exhaustive of relevant concerns. As will be seen, in both the formal and informal 
sense, comprehensive rationality appears to be unattainable. 
43 Cf Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology 1, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 85 
(1972) (describing use of "the device of an imagined 'impartial spectator'" by proponents 
of CBA to bolster the appearance of objectivity to their policy analyses). 
44 See McKibbin & Wilcoxen, supra note 10, at 115 ("[Ulncertainty is the single most 
important attribute of climate change as a policy problem. From climatology to econom-
ics, the uncertainties in climate change are pervasive, large in magnitude, and very 
difficult to resolve."). 
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therefore cannot model how sulfate particles, water vapor, and clouds 
interact in the atmosphere to mitigate or to enhance warming effects. 
We do not know with any degree of precision how temperature in-
creases will impact agriculture, forests, vector-related diseases, heat-
related deaths, flood zones, coastlines, storm intensity levels, freshwater 
supplies, or species extinctions. Perhaps most troubling, we cannot be-
gin to pinpoint the likelihood of catastrophic climate-related events 
such as the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, the shutdown 
of thermohaline circulation in the Atlantic, or the release of frozen 
methane deposits. In short, we do not know with anything other than 
an anemic level of confidence what will be the consequences of our 
atmospheric experiment. 45 
By providing a semblance of order and exactitude where none ex-
ists, therefore, the results of CBA implicitly obscure the severity of cli-
mate change uncertainties. Consider as a simple example Lomborg's 
treatment of the human health toll threatened by climate change.46 To 
calculate potential climate-induced losses of human life, Lomborg re-
lies upon Nordhaus's calculation of human health impacts from cli-
mate change which in turn relies upon a study that is restricted to cli-
mate-related diseases.47 The IPCC meanwhile reports with high 
confidence that climate change also will result in an increase in heat-
related deaths and illnesses due to more frequent heat waves, an in-
crease in drowning, intestinal, and respiratory diseases due to more 
frequent flooding, and an increase in malnutrition due to reduced 
crop yields in certain regions of the world.48 Nevertheless, because 
these health effects have not been estimated with sufficient precision to 
calculate a damages function, Lomborg's CBA simply pretends that 
they do not exist. 
The uncertainties of climate change, moreover, go to our very 
ability to identify and understand categories of costs and benefits, not 
just our ability to measure them and to predict their likelihood. In 
this regard, CBA seems especially ill-equipped to address the threat of 
45 See Myles Allen et aI., Uncertainty in the IPCC's Third Assessment Report, 293 SCI. 430, 
430 (2001) ("It was the unanimous view of the [Third Assessment Report] lead authors 
that no method of assigning probabilities to a 100-year-climate forecast is sufficien tly widely 
accepted and documented ... to pass the extensive IPCC review process."). 
46 LOMBORG, supra note 26, at 305-06. 
47 Id. at 305-12; see NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 27, at 80-81 (citing CHRISTOPHER 
J.L. MURRAY & ALAN D. LOPEZ, ThE GI.OBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE (1996». 
48 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IM-
PACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS ch. 3.5, 4.7 (2001), 
available athttp://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/015.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2004). 
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potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change. Although 
several scenarios have been discussed in the scientific literature in 
which climate change spins dramatically and irreversibly out of con-
trol, at present our understanding of such scenarios is limited simply 
to assessing their scientific plausibility, rather than estimating their 
empirical likelihood.49 Despite this limited knowledge, a specially-
appointed committee of the National Research Council recently did 
conclude that "greenhouse warming and other human alterations of 
the earth system may increase the possibility of large, abrupt, and un-
welcome regional or global climatic events. "50 Such abrupt climatic 
events could include "changes in coupled modes of atmospheric-
ocean behavior, the occurrence of droughts, and the vigor of ther-
mohaline circulation in the North Atlantic. "51 According to the com-
mittee, each of these events could be accompanied by ecological and 
socioeconomic effects of enormous impact. 52 In sum, climate change 
poses real, but as yet non-quantifiable, catastrophic threats that must 
be considered as part of any complete policymaking process. 
Substantially for this reason, a variety of international interests 
and voices have converged around the precautionary principle as an ap-
propriate response to climate change, particularly with respect to its 
potentially catastrophic but currently inestimable risks.53 Although 
susceptible to numerous interpretations, the precautionary principle 
often is taken to hold "that if it is known that an action may cause pro-
found and irreversible environmental damage which permanently 
reduces the welfare of future generations, but the probability of such 
damage is not known, then it is inequitable to act as if the probability 
is known. "54 In other words, it is inequitable to maintain nominal ad-
herence to the notion of comprehensive rationality when the precon-
ditions for its effective operation are absent. Instead, society should 
establish "safe minimum standards ... for protecting Earth's life-
support systems in the face of virtually inevitable unpleasant sur-
49 See CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENCE, STRATEGIES, & SOLUTIONS, supra note 37, at 6-82. 
50 COMM. ON ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE OF THE NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT 
CLIMATE CHANGE: INEVITABLE SURPRISES 1 (2002). 
51 Id. at 108. 
5! See id. at 118-52. 
55 See generaUy Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 
1003 (2003). 
54 Charles Perrings, Reserved Rationality and the Precautionary Principle: Technological 
Change, Time and Uncertainty in Environmental Decision Making, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: 
THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAIN ABILITY 153, 165-66 (Robert Costanza ed., 
1991). 
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prises. "55 In the climate change context, for instance, the safe mini-
mum standards imperative would seem to require acting to restrict 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at least to a level 
that would eliminate the plausible threat of catastrophic scenarios. 
Critics of the precautionary principle, on the other hand, argue 
that the unrecognized costs of behaving according to its dictates may 
sometimes turn out to be more significant than the harm sought to be 
avoided.56 Behaving with precaution, in other words, entails its own 
costs, both direct (e.g., compliance costs) and indirect (e.g., opportu-
nity costs, iatrogenic risks) that must be considered alongside the cost 
that is being guarded against through precautionary action. For this 
reason, critics argue in favor of a decisionmaking framework that 
maintains fidelity to the notion of assessing consequences compre-
hensively, rather than resorting to a conservative position, such as the 
precautionary principle, that may turn out in individual cases to be 
suboptima1.57 Of course, in a decision making environment of true 
uncertainty, in which outcome probabilities cannot be assigned to the 
possible consequences of an action or event, it is by definition un-
knowable whether the consequences of regulating (e.g., averting po-
tentially devastating climate-induced events in the future) will out-
weigh the consequences of not regulating (e.g., foregoing the benefits 
of continued levels of greenhouse gas emissions).58 Comprehensive 
rationality therefore cannot be attained. Instead, a more pragmatic 
approach is required in order for decisionmaking to continue to 
function at all when true uncertainty is present.59 
In raising these objections, critics of the precautionary principle 
seem to have assumed that the only meaningful way in which to think 
55 Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecological Economics and the Carrying Capacity of the Earth, in INVEST-
ING IN NATURAL CAPITAL: THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SUSTAINABILITY 38,49 (A.Jans-
son et aI., eds., 1994). 
56 See M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL RISK AsSESSMENT 85-88 (2001); JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIE-
NER, RISK VERSUS RISK 10-41 (1995);Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, 
in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK AsSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1509 (Dennis 
D. Paustenbach ed., 2002);Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precaution-
ary Principle and the Proposed International Safety Protoco~ 35 TEx. INT'L LJ., 173 194-97 
(2000); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 851, 859-60 (1996); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle!, 31 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L.lnst.) 10,790,10,799 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1020-29. 
57 See Adler, supra note 56, at 205. 
58 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20 (1921) (distinguishing 
between risk, which can be measured, and uncertainty, which cannot). 
59 Some methods by which CBA practitioners begin that pragmatic project are dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 63-65. 
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about and react to potential hazards is to compare their likelihood 
and magnitude against the cost of averting them; in other words, to 
evaluate the consequences of action or inaction.60 From this perspec-
tive, resort to the precautionary principle appears to be an abandon-
ment of the quest to maximize some overall desideratum solely in 
light of expected consequences. But, of course, this brand of conse-
quentialism does not exhaust the universe of respectable and widely-
held moral theories nor, indeed, is it necessarily the best-suited theory 
to govern decisionmaking under true uncertainty. Non-
consequentialist theories, for instance, might begin with the existence 
of an inalienable right held by each generation to the benefit of a 
minimally stable climate and a corresponding duty on the part of 
each preceding generation not to act in a manner that jeopardizes the 
baseline level of climate stability. On this account, the existence of a 
plausible worst-case scenario in which climate stability is severely and 
irreversibly disrupted would in itself constitute a sufficient reason for 
restricting greenhouse emissions at least to a level in which the worst 
case scenario no longer seemed plausible-a course of action that 
seems precisely to mirror the advice of the precautionary principle. 
Seen from this light, the precautionary principle is neither "inco-
herent"61 nor "indeterminate,"62 as critics claim, but rather reflects a 
moral theory that is capable of rational and internally consistent appli-
cation even under conditions of true uncertainty. CBA, in contrast, 
must revert under true uncertain ty to devices such as (1) the minimax 
principle, which shares more conceptual ground with the precaution-
ary principle than with the maximizing aspirations of CBA;63 (2) Monte 
Carlo procedures and other statistical methods for generating hypo-
thetical distributions of unknown probabilities, which can help to iden-
tifY those policy prescriptions that would prevail under various possible 
states of the world, but which cannot eliminate underlying uncertain-
60 See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 1020-29. 
61 Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists 1: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 315, 333 (2002). 
62 Stone, supra note 56, at 10,799. 
63 The minimax principle counsels minimizing the maximum possible loss when faced 
with uncertain prospects. As Cass Sunstein notes, one can view the precautionary pFinciple 
and the minimax principle both as directing "officials to identifY the worst case among the 
various options, and to select that option whose worst case is least bad." Sun stein, supra 
note 53, at 1033. 
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ties;64 or (3) a Bayesian approach, which attempts to get the conse-
quentialist ball rolling simply by assigning, more or less arbitrarily, a 
prior subjective belief to the unknown probability.65 Because none of 
these approaches truly overcomes the problem of uncertainty, none is 
able to fulfill CBA's normative promise that its outputs ensure the 
maximization of aggregate welfare. Instead, decisionmakers are left to 
rely on a conviction that their methodological devices provide better 
outcomes than less formulaic approaches to human judgment, even 
though at their heart the devices contain a similar but much less trans-
parent leap of faith. 
Significantly, as Daniel Farber notes in a provocative recent dis-
cussion of complexity theory, there are important reasons to suspect 
that some environmental risks may not conform at all to the well-
behaved patterns presumed by statistical uncertainty procedures such 
as those frequently used in conjunction with CBA.66 As Farber de-
scribes, "[t]he problem is not simply that we are in the early stages of 
scientific investigation but also that many environmental issues in-
volve complex dynamic systems with nonlinear properties. "67 Under 
such conditions, scientists cannot and should not rule out the possi-
bility that the uncertain system will behave according to what are 
known as power law distributions, in which "there is no [meaningful] 
'average' event," but rather "simply many small ones, a few larger 
ones, and occasionally extremely large ones. "68 Significantly, our cur-
rent understanding suggests that climate change may represent just 
such a chaotic system. Statistical uncertainty procedures, in contrast, 
typically presume a world that is incapable of the "nasty surprises" en-
tailed by power law distributions.69 Thus, rather than adopting the 
type of precautionary approach that is counseled by the implications 
of complexity theory,70 CBA instead seems to adopt a process of 
highly sophisticated, but potentially groundless, statistical roulette. 
64 See NORDHAUS, supra note 26, at 178-84. For a discussion of how Monte Carlo pro-
cedures are used in toxic risk assessment, see Susan R. Poulter, Monte Carlo Procedures in 
Environmental Risk Assessment-Science, Policy and Legal Issues, 9 RISK 7 (1998). 
66 See Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the Precautionary Principle, 12 DUKE ENVTI.. 
L. & POL'y F. 265, 272-74 (2002). 
66 See Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 149 (2003). 
67Id. 
68 Id. at 154. 
69 Id. at 146. 
70 See id. at 168-72. 
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Nor do alternative methods of dealing with true uncertainty in the 
CBA framework overcome these limitations. Somewhat in line with the 
Bayesian approach, for instance, Nordhaus's model includes a cost es-
timate of the risks of catastrophic events that was derived using "a sur-
vey of experts" who were asked to respond to the following question: 
Some people are concerned about a low-probability, high 
consequence output of climate change. Assume by "high 
consequence" we mean a 25 percent loss in global income 
indefinitely, which is approximately the loss in output during 
the Great Depression .... What is the probability of such a 
high-consequence outcome ... if the warming is 3 degrees C 
in 2090 ... ?71 
Using the probability estimate generated by responses to this survey, 
Nordhaus calculates the global ''WfP [willingness-to-pay] to avoid cata-
strophic risk"72 by multiplying the likelihood of a catastrophe by its dol-
lar equivalent-made tractable by the fact that Nordhaus has defined 
catastrophe as a percentage loss of global income-and adjusting the 
result upward to reflect society's general aversion to risk.73 In this man-
ner, Nordhaus concludes that the world currently is willing to sacrifice 
only one percent of global GDP in order to avoid the consequences of 
a catastrophic global warming event.74 As noted above,75 this amount, 
combined with estimates of other harmful consequences of climate 
change, translates into only a very modest optimal reduction of global 
carbon emissions-far less than would be required under a non-
consequentialist, precautionary approach that sought to elinlinate the 
possibility of catastrophic climate-change scenarios altogether. 
Suppose, though, that one of the generic "high consequence" sce-
narios described by Nordhaus actually eventuates, in which case human 
suffering, death, and other adverse consequences deemed equivalent 
to "a 25 percent loss in global income indefinitely" befalls future gen-
erations.76 Will members of those future generations believe the deci-
sionmaking process that led us to pose this threat was adequately pro-
tective of their interests? Is it sufficient that some number of experts 
71 NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 27, at 87 (citing William D. Nordhaus, Expert Opin-
ion on Climatic Change, 82 AM. SCIENTIST 45 (1994». 
72 [d. at 88-91. 
73 See id. at 88-90. 
74 [d. at 90-91. 
75 See supra text accompanying notes 28-31. 
76 NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 27, at 87. 
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will have assigned a purely subjective probability figure to currently in-
estimable but scientifically plausible worst case scenarios? Is it sufficient 
that the global willingness-to-pay to avoid such scenarios will have been 
calculated in a manner that avoids asking any human directly how 
much they would be willing to sacrifice in order to eliminate a risk of 
devastating magnitude on future generations? What are the reasons for 
assuming that direct human responses to such a question would be less 
reliable than a method of decisionmaking, such as CBA, that studiously 
avoids addressing matters of right and responsibility? What are the rea-
sons for treating catastrophic losses indistinguishably from an agglom-
eration of trivial ones, albeit with a slight upward adjustment for some 
decontextualized notion of risk aversion? 
In light of questions such as these, CBA proponents frequently 
emphasize that the results of their analyses are intended merely to 
provide one input into the overall decisionmaking process and that 
policymakers therefore remain free to give the results of CBA as much 
or as little weight as they desire. This reassurance is unsatisfactory, 
however, for it ignores the cognitive lure of comprehensive rationality. 
CBA offers the appearance, if not the reality, of certitude and objectiv-
ity. As Laurence Tribe observed over thirty years ago, "[s]uch 'end-
result' theories have great appeal, for the notion of maximizing some 
desired end may seem the very essence of rationality. "77 Moreover, by 
generating estimates of the "optimal carbon reduction for the globe," 
CBA proponents like Lomborg quite clearly imply that alternative, 
more stringent reduction policies are suboptimal and therefore re-
quire significant justification by their proponents.7S Nevermind that 
the supposedly optimal figure has failed to account for a host of pos-
sible consequences about which we currently lack sufficient under-
standing to model, including some consequences that may jeopardize 
the very ability of human civilizations to continue to exist. 
B. Valuation 
As noted already, CBA seeks to do more than simply generate a 
systematic list of the pros and cons of climate change or of efforts to 
mitigate or adapt to climate change. In addition, CBA seeks to provide 
a common metric for them, such that policymakers need only run a 
spreadsheet in order to determine the optimal policy intervention into 
the carbon economy. Obviously, then, the policymaker and her con-
77 Tribe, supra note 43, at 79. 
78 See LOMBORG, supra note 26, at 306. 
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stituent public must have a great deal of faith in the valuation method-
ologies used in order for CBA to generate democratically acceptable 
results. For good reason, however, CBA practitioners have been unable 
to come up with widely agreeable methods for determining the mone-
tary value of non-marketed goods such as the Great Barrier Reef, a 
child's life, or an endangered species. This Section will address only a 
few of the philosophically and methodologically troublesome aspects of 
the valuation exercises typically utilized in conjunction with regulatory 
CBA. These problems, however, cut to the very core of CBA's appropri-
ateness for use in policy contexts such as climate change.79 
Recall Speth's hope that humanity will resolve to ensure "the pro-
tection for their own sake of the living communities that evolved here 
with us."so IT such a commitment does develop as part of Speth's hoped-
for cultural transformation, it will reflect the judgment that other life 
forms are capable of holding interests of their own and are, therefore, 
worthy of respect and care over and above the level that might be mer-
ited solely according to an assessment of their value to humans. CBA, 
on the other hand, is premised on a liberal market conception in which 
only humans-and more specifically only individual humans-are ca-
pable of holding interests. For that reason, the value of non-human life 
forms is acknowledged only to the extent that humans value them. This 
distinction is highly significant in light of our growing understanding 
that climate change threatens the rapid extinction of literally thousands 
of non-human species.81 In order for such a massive potential loss of 
biodiversity to register as a cost in the view of the CBA practitioner, 
humans presently must demonstrate some credible commitment to the 
preservation of species. 
One method of demonstrating such a commitment is through the 
use of contingent valuation surveys in which researchers attempt to 
elicit the amount that individuals would be willing to pay to support 
public goods such as the preservation of an endangered species, assum-
ing that such goods were capable of being traded through market 
transactions.82 Using these hypothetical market instruments, research-
79 Readers seeking a more thorough critique should consult ACKERMAN & HEINZER-
LING, supra note 15, at 61-90, 153-78 and SIDNEY A SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 
RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 92-120 (2003). 
80 See supra text accompanying note 9 (emphasis added). 
81 See Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145 
(2004) (finding that ·on the basis of mid-range climate-warming scenarios for 2050, ... 
15-37% of species in [aJ sample of regions and taxa will be 'committed to extinction'"). 
52 See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 315-20 
(1989). 
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ers hope to derive an accurate estimate of the individual's "true" valua-
tion of the endangered species. As Dana Ritov and Daniel Kahneman 
note, however, the estimates derived from such surveys are better un-
derstood as expressing an attitude regarding "the perceived severity" of 
the need to preserve the public good, rather than actually being "moti-
vated by the good that is to be acquired. "83 That is, individuals often 
interpret the contingent valuation instrument as a strength-of-opinion 
survey, rather than a market transaction of the form that researchers 
hope to simulate. This account helps to explain, for instance, why re-
spondents sometimes do not vary their stated willingness-to-pay as the 
purported amount of the public good being preserved is changed, 
even by orders of magnitude.84 It also helps to explain why significant 
numbers of respondents refuse to participate in the surveys at all or 
state willingness-to-pay amounts that researchers deem unrealistically 
large.85 In essence, respondents are attempting to make a political 
statement through the market medium of the survey instrument-a 
medium, incidentally, that is being forced on them by the experimental 
researcher. 
Notably, contingent valuation practitioners typically dismiss re-
sponses that do not conform to the researcher's expectations of what a 
well-behaved preference ordering for public goods should resemble.86 
Dismissal is necessary because such "protest votes" reflect views that the 
CBA methodology simply cannot countenance, such as the beliefs that 
83 Ilana Ritov & Daniel Kahneman, How People Value the Environment: Attitudes Versus 
Economic Values, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR 33, 37-39 (Max H. Bazerman et 
al. eds., 1997); see also Daniel Kahneman, The Review Panel's Assessment: Comments by Professor 
Daniel Kahneman, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: AN AsSESSMENT OF THE CONTIN-
GENT VALUATION METHOD 185, 190-93 (R. G. Cummings et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that 
stated willingness-to-pay for environmental goods can be interpreted as symbolic or ex-
pressive action); Daniel Kahneman & Jack Knetsch, Valuing Environmental Goods: The Pur-
chase of Moral Satisfaction, 22J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57 (1992) (concluding that contri-
butions to public goods provide a sense of moral satisfaction, rather than more tangible 
benefits to the contributor); Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willing-
ness to Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTI' 5 (1994) 
(finding that willingness-to-pay for public goods aligned with a cluster of correlated re-
sponses including moral satisfaction, judgments of the importance of the public issue, and 
statements of political support for government action). See generally HOWARD MARGOLIS, 
SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITI': A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982) (arguing 
that individual contributions to public goods provide utility through the act of contribu-
tion, not through benefits flowing as a consequence of the contribution as in the case of 
an ordinary consumer purchase). 
IU See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 163. 
85 See id. at 162-63. 
86 See id. at 163-64. 
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not everything valuable is necessarily monetizable, that explicitly trad-
ing-off sacred categories in CBA may unwittingly diminish the sacred-
ness of those categories, and that some judgments should be made col-
lectively through the democratic process, rather than individually 
through decentralized market transactions. Because the CBA method-
ology is premised on a contrary set of foundational assumptions, re-
searchers must sanitize the responses that they gather from contingent 
valuation surveys in order to preserve the methodology's nominal co-
herence. As Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling describe, however, 
much is lost in the process of sanitization: "By narrowly constraining 
the conditions under which responses in contingent valuation surveys 
will be counted, the researchers have imposed a new literacy test for 
participation, demanding that voters who want their votes to be 
counted frame their answers in an artificially quantified vocabulary. "87 
Contingent valuation surveys represent what is known as a stated 
preference methodology. That is, researchers ask individuals to state 
the amount that they would be willing to pay to preserve a public good, 
but do not actually require individuals to make good on their promised 
contributions. Revealed preference methodologies, on the other hand, 
attempt to infer an implicit valuation of some public good through the 
actual market choices of individuals.88 Environmental Protection 
Agency economists, for instance, recently examined a parent's willing-
ness to pay premium prices for organic baby food as an indirect meas-
ure of the parent's valuation of her infant's life-a value that the 
economists argue can then be used by regulators to set government 
health and safety standards for children more generally.89 Such meth-
odologies are thought to produce especially realistic valuations be-
cause, unlike hypothetical survey instruments or political referenda, 
the choices examined will have occurred under the disciplinary con-
straints of actual markets with real resources at stake. Moreover, such 
methodologies may offer the only credible method of deriving willing-
ness-to-pay measures for saving human lives, given the seemingly in-
surmountable problems facing contingent valuation studies that at-
87 Id. at 165. 
88 See W. Adamowicz et aI., Combining Revealed and Stated Preference Methods for Valuing 
EnvironmentalAmenities, 26]. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 271, 272 (1994). 
89 See generally KELLY B. MACGUIRE ET AL., WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO REDUCE A CHILD'S 
PESTICIDE EXPOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM TIlE BABY FOOD MARKET (Nat'l Ctr. for Envtl. 
Econ., Working Paper No. 02-03, May 2002), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/ 
epa/eed.nsf/WPNumberNew/2002-03?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 23, 2004). 
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tempt to depict human lives as being explicitly subject to market trad-
ing.90 
In part for these reasons, when evaluating environmental, health, 
and safety regulations, U.S. federal agencies typically use a value of 
life that has been empirically derived through observations of labor 
markets.91 The central premise of this methodology is that, other 
things being equal, workers will demand a higher wage-or a "com-
pensating wage differential"-in order to accept a higher level of oc-
cupational fatality risk. Large data sets have been analyzed with this 
assumption in mind and a consensus view among CBA practitioners 
seems to have developed that the implicit value of life revealed by 
wage premiums is somewhere between $3 and $7 million.92 Such 
figures routinely are used to compute the monetized benefits of pro-
posed regulations that aim to save human lives, affording in the proc-
ess a ready basis for comparison against the purported economic costs 
of regulation. As noted above,93 these figures are said to provide an 
especially reliable basis for setting public safety standards because they 
represent the actual tradeoffs that individuals make between money 
and life when determining their own tolerances for risk. 
Even on CBA's own terms, however, the reliability of the wage-risk 
premium studies depends critically on the tightness of fit between 
subject labor markets and the competitive market ideal. At least two of 
the most important assumptions of the market ideal-risk awareness 
and free mobility among laborers-lack a strong empirical basis when 
one examines actual market operations.94 According to one study, for 
instance, the implicit value of life revealed by wage-risk interactions 
appears to be several million dollars higher for union workers than 
for non-union workers, holding constant other significant variables.95 
Union membership, in other words, seems to be a strong determinant 
of the size of the compensating wage differential-a wage-risk effect 
that more closely captures bargaining power than willingness-to-pay 
and that, therefore, suggests a less normatively attractive basis for 
90 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 80-81 (describing methodological 
and participation rate problems of using contingent valuation studies in the context of 
saving human lives). 
91 See id. at 75-90. 
92 See id. at 81-84. 
93 See supra text accompanying note 90. 
94 See ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 195-203; SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 79, at 
98-100. 
95 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 79; see also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, 
supra note 79, at 99. 
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policymaking than has been supposed by CBA practitioners. By failing 
to control for the influence of labor market structure in this manner, 
previous wage-risk premium studies may have generated misleading 
results-an un surprising outcome given the sheer number of eco-
nomic factors that influence wages other than fatality rates and that 
therefore threaten to confound study results. 
A recent study in the Journal of Risk and Insurance attempts to get 
around these kinds of data problems by focusing on changes in indus-
try accident and fatality rates, as well as wage rates, over a period of 
seven years.96 The researchers reasoned that, if the compensating 
wage differential thesis is correct-that is, if labor markets really are 
characterized by sufficient risk information and bargaining equity to 
reliably correlate compensation with occupational risk exposure-
then we should expect to observe a relationship between accident 
rates and wages over time, after controlling for other important vari-
ables.97 The researchers in this study, however, observed no such rela-
tionship, despite using a Bureau of Labor Statistics data set that cov-
ered the most consistent and significant change in occupational 
injury and fatality rates in the last quarter century.98 Reflecting on the 
various methodological problems associated with the wage premium 
literature, the researchers concluded by observing: "[W]e are frankly 
surprised that estimates of the value of a life based on occupational 
fatalities and wages have ever been used. "99 
Many of the data problems found in the wage-risk premium litera-
ture are caused by the fact that the United States has managed to dras-
tically reduce its occupational hazard levels over the course of the past 
century-an accomplishment, incidentally, that occurred through New 
Deal and other protective legislation that did not depend on CBA for 
its justification.loo For this reason, the few remaining labor segments of 
96 See William P. Jennings & Albert Kinderman, The Value of Life: Nelli Evidence of the Rela-
tionship Betllleen Changes in Occupation Fatalities and Wages of Hourly Workers, 1992 to 1999, 70 
J. RISK & INS. 549, 549-50 (2003). 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 553. 
99 Id. at 559. Similarly, the researchers whose study contmlled for the influence of la-
bor market imperfections on wage-risk interactions concluded that therr "results cast 
doubt on the very existence of compensating differentials for all workers, union and non-
union alike." Peter Dmman & Paul Hagstmn, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revis-
ited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116, 133 (1998). 
100 Jennings & Kinderman, supra note 96, at 559; see also SAGOFF, supra note 14. at 116 
("A hundred years of compassionate legislation has pmduced conditions in which econo-
mists now argue that voluntary markets set an appmpriate value on worker safety. This is a 
result not of mme efficient markets but of persistent ethical regulation."). 
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the economy that exhibit an occupational mortality rate high enough 
to even plausibly support the wage-risk premium methodology tend to 
be segments populated by those with the least social, economic, and 
political capital.101 CBA practitioners seek to extrapolate from the cir-
cumstances of these less well-off individuals a value of life that will apply 
across the entire range of risk contexts that confront government poli-
cymakers. No allowance is made for the possibility that better-off indi-
viduals might wish to devote resources to public protection at levels 
higher than male, blue-collar workers are able to devote in their private 
workplace struggles. Thus, through the wage-risk valuation methodol-
ogy, CBA practitioners enshrine into public policy aspects of our econ-
omy that many might regard as regrettable side-effects of market capi-
talism, rather than desiderata in their own right. 
Such problems are in many respects magnified in the global poli-
cymaking context, where potential distortions due to divergent re-
source endowments are likely to be even more pronounced. Neverthe-
less, many analyses of the costs and benefits of climate change do in 
fact distinguish between the value of lives on a country by country or a 
region by region basis. One prominent analyst, for instance, first di-
vided countries into high income, middle income, and low income 
categories, and then assumed a value of human life of $1,500,000, 
$300,000, and $100,000, respectively, for the three categories.102 Al-
though purportedly a value-neutral approach based only on varying 
willingness-to-pay calculations for the three regions, this method of 
valuation nevertheless entails a willingness to invest resources to protect 
Americans at a level fifteen times higher than sub-Saharan Africans.I03 
One might think that such an approach has it exactly backwards. Mter 
all, the majority of human-induced greenhouse gas concentrations cur-
rently in the atmosphere are traceable to the industrial activities of the 
developed world, while the majority of premature deaths and other ad-
verse health effects expected from climate change threaten to strike the 
101 Cf, SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 79, at 100 (noting that "[t]he pool of labor 
for hazardous jobs ... consists of disadvantaged workers who are willing to accept health 
and safety risks in return for very modest amounts of compensation" (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
102 See SAMUEL FRANKHAUSER, VALUING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE 
GREENHOUSE 47-48 (1995). 
103 Cf. John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STIJD. 953, 957 
(2000) ("In a cost-benefit analysis of global warming, willingness to pay would treat an 
American life as worth 10 or 20 Indian lives."). 
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developing world.104 Speaking in terms of moral responsibility, then, 
rather than merely in terms of credits and debits in a greenhouse 
ledger stripped of human context, one naturally might think that the 
interests of the developing world should count at a rate greater than 
those of the developed world. 105 One would, however, have reached a 
conclusion opposite to the approach often implicitly taken by CBA.I06 
Each of the valuation approaches considered in this Section as-
sumes that the proper measure of a good's worth is the amount that 
individuals would be willing to pay in order to preserve the good in a 
well-functioning market. A different approach altogether would be to 
assume that valuations are more reliably captured through society's will-
ingness to act collectively in order to preserve the threatened good, 
including, for instance, through protective legislation. As Sagoff ob-
serves, unlike the comprehensive rationality of CBA, "[t]his kind ofra-
tionality depends on the virtues of collective problem solving; it consid-
ers the reasonableness of ends in relation to the values they embody 
and the sacrifices we must make to achieve them. "107 To be sure, a 
monetary value will be implied by the level of resources chosen to be 
committed to a good's preservation, but this value will not have driven 
the initial selection of public policy. Rather, the value will be merely an 
ancillary effect of a policy choice that instead was premised on social 
values, explicitly discussed and mediated through a democratic deci-
sionmaking process. 
In the climate change context, therefore, an entirely different ap-
proach to policymaking is to simply identify the expected costs of im-
plementing a given proposal, so that observers can have a clear sense of 
the amount that must be given up in order to achieve a policy goal that, 
at least in part, is to be considered and evaluated through the deci-
sionmaking process itself. As Lomborg notes, economic studies suggest 
that implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would entail an annual cost 
104 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Com- . 
mons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 255 (2000). 
105 See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETIncs OF GLOBALIZATION 43-44 (2002) (not-
ing that if one takes account of historical contributions to the current greenhouse plight, 
"the emissions of industrialized nations ought to be held down to much less than a per 
capita equal share" with the developing nations). 
106 See Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of 
Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 223, 264-66 (2003) (describing method of calculating life years lost according to 
country by country per capita income figures and noting that the method can imply a 
willingness to invest resources to protect sub-Saharan Mrican lives at less than one percent 
of the level for American lives). 
107 SAGOFF, supra note 14, at 70. 
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of somewhere between two and four percent of developed nations' 
gross domestic product (GDP).108 Armed with this knowledge, deci-
sionmakers and their constituen t publics need only ask themselves 
whether incremental progress toward stabilizing greenhouse gas emis-
sions is worth foregoing two to four percent of GDP. The benefits of the 
Kyoto Protocol on this approach are not given by a contrived monetiza-
tion of the averted adverse effects of climate change, but rather by the 
amount society collectively is willing to sacrifice in order to purchase a 
margin of safety under the Protocol's dictates. Monetization mayor 
may not help to inform such a decision, but it cannot replace it. 
C. Discounting 
Given the atmospheric persistence of greenhouse gases, relevant 
time frames for climate change CBA stretch into the hundreds of 
years. As a result, many of the benefits of climate change mitigation 
policies consist of deaths and illnesses that otherwise would afflict 
generations far into the future. Faced with these time horizons, re-
searchers must articulate some method of comparing the impacts of 
atmospheric warming across time, even if it is the simple method of 
assuming that a life today is ''worth'' the same amount as a life tomor-
roW.109 Practitioners of CBA typically attempt to normalize the in-
tertemporal distribution of costs and benefits through the use of an 
exponential discount rate, which is the logical converse of compound-
ing interest.110 Accordingly, lives that will be lost in the future due to 
increased carbon loading of the atmosphere typically are not valued 
by CBA at the going rate for lives today. Instead, they are discounted 
to a present value, which often results in numbers that are vanishingly 
small: one million lives discounted over 145 years at ten percent are 
"worth" less than a single life today.lll 
The moral basis for discounting in this manner is rarely articu-
lated. Sometimes it is argued that discounting future harms is appro-
108 LOMBORG, supra note 26, at 318. 
109 See JOHN BROOME, COUNTING TIlE COST OF GLOBAL WARMING 52-112 (1992); Ken-
neth Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 125, 130 (James 
P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996). 
110 See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future Generations, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 289, 291. 
111 See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in JUSTICE BETWEEN 
AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144-45 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992). As 
Dan Farber cleverly notes, examples such as this tempt one to view discounting as "an ap-
plication of 'compound disinterest.'" Farber, supra note 110, at 295 (emphasis added). 
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priate because future generations will be richer and therefore better 
able to handle the harmful consequences of climate change.u2 But this 
is not an argument that we should discount something because it will 
occur in the future; it is an argument that we should discount some-
thing because it will happen to better off individuals.1l3 As a matter of 
distributive justice, we may agree with such an argument, but it requires 
a much different implementation device than numerical discounting. 
Moreover, if we use the standard income-dependent or income-
influenced economic methods of valuing life,u4 then an anticipated 
rise in future incomes suggests that future lives are more worth saving 
than present lives, not less. u5 Therefore, rather than discount future 
benefits of climate change mitigation, on this view, we should magnifY 
them. The fact that this result is counterintuitive suggests that the nor-
mative justification for discounting has been insufficiently established. 
A stronger defense of discounting invokes the economic concept 
of opportunity costs. By discounting future lives to a present value, the 
argument goes, governments ensure that climate change mitigation 
policies produce a "return on investment" at least as high as the dis-
count rate that is being utilized. In that manner, regulatory expendi-
tures can be avoided that might have been invested more profitably in 
other social projects or in capital markets. Strangely enough, therefore, 
it seems that future generations will be better ofJifwe discount the value 
of their lives, because we will leave them with a resource base that has 
taken advantage of the best available investment opportunities. Along 
these lines, Lomborg concludes that "a sensible investment with a good 
yield will leave our descendants and future generations of poor people 
with far greater resources, and this is probably a far better way of look-
ing after their interests than investing in low-yielding greenhouse gas 
reductions. "U6 
112 See Cowen & Parfit. supra note 111. at 148. 
m Seeid. 
114 IncomMependent methods include the explicit use of annual income as a meas-
ure of the value of a human life. See Kysar. supra note 106. Income-influenced methods 
include both stated and revealed willingness-to-pay methodologies. Cf Frank Ackerman & 
Lisa Heinzerling. If It Exists, It's Getting Bigger: Revising the Value of a Statistical Life 1 (Global 
Dev. and Env't Inst. Working Paper No. 01-06, Oct. 2001) (noting that implicit value of life 
studies have failed to account for the income elasticity of demand for safety and offering a 
revised figure of $13.8 million in light of income growth following original wage-risk stud-
ies) (on file with author). 
115 See Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs, supra note 15, at 2051. 
116 LOMBORG, supra note 26. at 312. 314-15. Lomborg provides the following illustra-
tion: 
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This line of reasoning appears compelling until one recalls that 
the benefits of climate change mitigation consist at least partially of 
human lives that might otherwise have been lost in the future. The 
normative case for discounting-that it will leave future generations 
with a more valuable stock of resources-is in considerable tension 
with the fact that some members of those future generations are sa-
crificed in order to make the very alternative investments that are 
supposed to inure to their benefit. Obviously, if one takes seriously 
the moral injunction that human lives should not be used instrumen-
. tally without the consent of the sacrificed,ll7 then discounting de-
mands still further justification. All the CBA apologist demonstrates 
by appealing to opportunity costs is the fact that a life lost in the fu-
ture may be compensated for at lower cost than a life lost today. The de-
cision actually to sacrifice the life-and thereby to bring about a situa-
tion in which compensation becomes relevant-remains an entirely 
separate, and philosophically more problematic, matter. 
Consider a thought experiment to help elucidate this point. 
Suppose that our society was to set up a trust fund from which equal 
payments would be made to surviving family members or representa-
tives on account of the death of any individual member of the society. 
In light of the differing life expectancies that society members would 
have, the managers of our trust fund quite properly could earmark a 
lesser amount of money for younger members than for older mem-
bers. Likewise, they could set aside an even lesser amount for the not-
yet-born. In both cases, the later-expected death of the individual 
would allow the lesser amount set aside to grow through alternative 
investment until payment eventually became due. Notice, though, 
that the more or less arbitrary fact of being born later in time does 
not support a judgment that the future life actually is worth less than 
the current life, at least not in any sense that would justify the know-
ing sacrifice of one life over the other. 
To see why, suppose that some unforeseen societal emergency ac-
tually did necessitate the knowing sacrifice of a given number of lives. 
IT we chose an artificially low discount rate of 2 percent (so as to make green-
house gas cuts profitable) we would leave investments to future generations 
that were only worth 2 percen t. IT on the other hand our discoun t rate was set 
at 5 percent, we would spend the money on projects that make a profit of 
more than 5 percen t. 
Id. at 314-15. 
117 See SAGOFF, supra note 14, at 218-19. 
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Would we agree that the youngest members of society automatically 
should be chosen simply because our trust fund accounting appears to 
show that their lives have the lowest current monetary equivalent? Sup-
pose further that we could respond to the societal emergency by sa-
crificing a given number of the not-yet-born, perhaps by storing haz-
ardous waste in a container that will leak in a hundred years and cause 
a predictable number of deaths. Are we clear that the time value of 
money by itself would justifY taking those future lives over the currently 
living? Suppose finally that we could respond to the emergency either 
by sacrificing a given number of the not-yet-born or by lowering our 
current standard of living by two to four percentage points of GDP}18 
Now, do we not think that our trust fund accounting is entirely beside 
the point? 
The situation is even worse than this, for not only are we currently 
choosing to sacrifice future lives in order to preserve two to four per-
centage points of GDP, but we also are failing to ensure that resources 
actually are transferred to those future generations whose members we 
are sacrificing. To give the opportunity cost argument any practical 
significance, we would need some reliable intergenerational transfer 
mechanism to ensure that the resource base actually is expanded for 
the benefit of surviving members of future generations. As it is, how-
ever, we have inadequate means of knowing whether the resources in-
tended to make future generations better off are being conserved as 
durable capital or whether instead they are being consumed for the 
fleeting pleasure of the currently living. National income measures 
such as GDP are notoriously bereft of information about non-marketed 
goods such as environmental and social capital. GDP simply measures 
the absolute flow of commodities through the economy over a given 
time period; it makes no effort to measure the stock of resources from 
which that flow ultimately originates or to otherwise determine 
whether the flow is sustainable.1l9 The CBA discounter may take com-
fort in the knowledge that, in some purely hypothetical sense, future 
generations may be better off for having been discounted. Future gen-
erations themselves may not feel as sanguine.120 
llB See supra text accompanying note lOS. 
ll9 See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 
43 B.c. L. REV. 1, 2S-36 (2001). 
120 Cj. William R. Cline, Discounting for the Very Long Term, in DISCOUNTING AND 
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 131, 131 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999) 
("Discounting over centuries at today's return on capital implicitly makes a commitment 
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On a more technical level, it also bears noting that our very deci-
sion whether or not to save natural resources for future generations 
influences the rate of return for capital which, in turn, forms the basis 
of the strongest argument that CBA practitioners have for discount-
ing-the opportunity cost argument. But, of course, if the savings rate 
for natural capital in part determines the rate of return for all capital-
if, in other words, the decision whether to conserve natural resources 
influences the size of the opportunity cost that supposedly determines 
whether or not to conserve-then invoking opportunity costs as a 
justification for discounting is, at bottom, nothing more than concep-
tual bootstrapping. After all, how does Lomborg know that climate 
change mitigation is a "low-yielding" investment?121 He knows this be-
cause he has implicitly compared it-through discounting-to a rate of 
return for capital that takes as given the fossil fuel economy with its lais-
sez faire climate change policy. Put differently, the status quo of con-
tinued greenhouse emissions appears to be a better investment than 
abatement in part because the benefits of abatement have been dis-
counted at a rate that assumes abatement will not occur. Such circular-
ity may be tolerable for decisions of modest practical impact-in which 
the ultimate outcome might not be affected by the specification of a 
different reference case-but it hardly seems appropriate for address-
ing an issue with the enormity of climate change. 
In part for this reason, some CBA proponents attempt to un-
hinge the discount rate entirely from the rate of return for capital, 
relying for public policymaking instead on the use of a "'social' dis-
count rate" that is set according to the rate at which individuals seem 
to prefer the present to the future}22 At this point, the normative 
justification for discounting no longer depends on the opportunity 
cost argument, which at least purports to take account of the interests 
of future generations, but rather now is based on the bare assertion 
that "people are impatient, "123 and tend to prefer present consump-
tion to future consumption of an identical item. CBA practitioners 
seek to replicate this impatience in public policymaking by discount-
ing with similar haste the value of future benefits that will occur from 
proposed activities such as climate change mitigation. In that manner, 
that is not credible: that society will keep reinvesting at this rate to compensate distant 
future generations for damages imposed."). 
15. 
121 See supra text accompanying note 116; see also LOMBORG, supra note 26, at 112, 114-
122 See Farber, supra note 110, at 298. 
123 [d. at 297. 
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public resources will be devoted to the future only at the level that 
individuals seem to prefer when delaying their own personal 
gratification. Even proponents of CBA sometimes seem sheepish 
when offering this defense of discounting. Famed economist Robert 
Solow, for instance, argued that although as an ethical matter "no 
generation 'should' be favored over any other," discounting neverthe-
less is appropriate as a "concession to human weakness. "124 
Others argue that the social discount rate should be set accord-
ing to openly normative judgments about intergenerational equity.125 
They recognize that this "human weakness" justification for discount-
ing has strength, if at all, only in the intragenerational context, in 
which the effects of the public policy decision will be felt by the same 
individuals from whom the analyst is deriving the rate of time prefer-
ence.126 These analysts typically argue that future benefits should be 
discounted at some positive rate because otherwise present genera-
tions perpetually will be forced to forego present benefits in order to 
achieve the same level of benefits later at a lower present cost. That is, 
"if invested, our resources are expected to grow at [a market] rate, so 
that if we forego spending and invest the money instead, we can save 
more lives in the future with the amount foregone today. "127 And, of 
course, the same logic will apply tomorrow, such that current con-
sumption seemingly will be postponed indefinitely whenever CBA is 
forced to treat the interests of future generations pari passu with the 
interests of the present generation. 
The problem with this argument is that it merely demonstrates 
that the present generation might prefer to avoid unduly sacrificing 
for future generations; it does not explain why discounting is the 
124 Robert Solow, An Almost Practical Step Toward Sustainability, 19 RESOURCES POL 'y 162, 
165 (1993). 
125 See Arrow et aI., supra note 109, at 125, 131-34 (distinguishing between a descriptive 
view of discounting that relies on market rates of return or revealed time preference and a 
prescriptive view that depends on notions of intergenerational equity); Robert M. Solow, 
The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. I, 
10 (1974) ("The choice of a social discount rate is, in effect, a policy decision about ... 
intergenerational distribution."). 
126 See Cowen & Parfit, supra note Ill, at 155 ("Pure time preference within a single 
life does not imply pure time preference across different lives."). Even in this context, as 
Lisa Heinzerling notes, the CBA practitioner bears a heavy burden to explain why gov-
ernments should honor individuals' rate of time preference when the individuals them-
selves often seem to desire governmental assistance in guarding against its effects. See 
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs, mpra note 15, at 2046-49. 
127 John J. Donohue m, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount Discount-
ing, 108 YALE LJ. 1901, 1905 (1999). 
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proper method for implementing such a preference.128 Indeed, upon 
reflection, the choice of discount rate often seems downright trivial in 
comparison to the underlying distributive judgment that the discount-
ing methodology is attempting, however awkwardly, to subsume. Con-
sider, for example, the following question: "At what rate should the 
benefits of future timber harvesting be discounted when using CBA to 
determine the appropriate current level of harvesting from a particu-
lar forest?" If one's response is some variation of, "at whatever rate 
results in a sustainably managed forest," then one is in agreement 
with the view that distributive judgments precede the choice of discount 
rate. To be sure, the example uses a context in which the distributive 
judgment is relatively tractable and even appears to admit of an "op-
timal" outcome: Renewable resources should be harvested at a level 
that ensures maximum sustainable yield. 129 Nevertheless, the same 
conceptual framework underlies all issues of intergenerational re-
source distribution, including the intertemporal distribution of our 
atmosphere's capacity to absorb persistent greenhouse gases. Dis-
counting cannot resolve these issues; it can only obscure them. 
In a recent article, Dan Farber seeks to elide this difficulty by as-
suming that "we [already] have determined by some means-whether 
cost-benefit analysis or pure intuition-how much of our current re-
sources we are willing to sacrifice to obtain future environmental 
benefits. "130 With that assumption in place, Farber then demonstrates 
that the benefits of an environmental investment inevitably will de-
cline over time and thus, he argues, "discounting environmental 
benefits is not only ethically permissible but often unavoidable. "131 
Farber only has shown, however, that a discount rate is implied IJy any 
social decision involving a finite resource that must be distributed 
over an infinite time horizon. He has not shown that discounting is 
the proper method for resolving the initial question of how much of 
the resource to distribute to future generations. Indeed, that is the 
very decision that Farber treats as exogenous to his account. The 
problem, of course, is that it is also the decision that proponents of 
CBA seek to resolve in part through the use of discounting.132 
128 See Cowen & Parfi t, supra note 111, at 148. 
129 See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 675, 689-90 
(2003). 
130 Farber, supra note 110, at 293 (emphasis added); see also id. at 309-10. 
131 Id. at 293; see also id. at 309-14 (using a model to demonstrate the legitimacy of dis-
counting environmental benefits). 
132 See supra Part I. 
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To sum up, a third limitation of the use of CBA in the climate 
change context is that some components of the disutility caused by en-
vironmental harms simply cannot be priced and incorporated into cost-
benefit calculation without first asking a threshold question. This 
threshold question concerns the intergenerational distribution of natu-
ral resources, biodiversity, and other environmental goods, including, 
critically, the carbon-absorbing potential of the earth and its atmos-
phere. Just as each distribution of resources among the presently living 
gives rise to a unique efficient allocation of resources, each distribution 
of resources among different generations also entails a separate 
efficient equilibrium.l33 Accordingly, the question of how natural re-
sources should be distributed across time remains fundamentally an 
ethical question--one that will imply a discount rate, but not be deter-
mined by it. Only by directly confronting the ethical question in that 
manner can we hope to honor the second of Gus Speth's two central 
environmental obligations, our duty of "trusteeship of the earth's natu-
ral wealth and beauty for generations to come. "134 
D. Vision 
As we have seen, CBA attempts to subsume a variety of important 
ethical and practical judgments within the rubric of a purportedly 
straightforward efficiency-maximization exercise. Decisions about how 
to behave in the face of true uncertainty concerning potentially dev-
astating consequences of human action are masked by statistical un-
certainty procedures that, despite their technical sophistication, may 
depend on flatly unwarranted assumptions about the operations of 
the physical world.135 Society's level of commitment to the preserva-
tion of species, ecosystems, and human lives is divined from real or 
con trived individual market decisions in a process that, at best, is be-
set by a variety of methodological problems and, at worst, fundamen-
tally misconstrues the nature of the very public goods problem that 
demands collective judgment.l36 Finally, difficult and unavoidable' 
choices about how to distribute potentially massive costs and benefits 
among generations are elided through an elaborate mathematical 
153 See Richard B. Norgaard & Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Fu-
ture, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILI'IY 88, 
97-98 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991). 
1M See supra text accompanying note 9. 
1M See supra Part II.A. 
1!16 See supra Part II.B. 
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fiction, the discount rate.l37 At bottom, each of these features of CBA 
exhibits a common flaw, observed long ago by Laurence Tribe: 
"[Q1uantitative decision-making techniques ... reduce[J entire problems 
to terms that misstate their underlying structure, typically collapsing into 
the task of maximizing some simple quantity an enterprise whose or-
dering principle is not one of maximization at all. "138 
Indeed, this tendency to obscure difficult judgments through 
mischaracterization or misspecification seems to follow from the very 
structure of the CBA project. As intimated above,139 CBA practitioners 
typically treat individual preference formation as a process that is en-
tirely exogenous to their analysis. Thus, the many internal compro-
mises, hesitancies, and regrets that characterize individual behavior 
and choice never register a blip on the practitioner's radar. Instead, 
whatever preferences individuals seem to reveal through their market 
behavior are taken to be the best measure of true ''wants" or "desires" 
and, therefore, also are taken exclusively to provide the valuation in-
puts that in critical part determine the policy outputs of CBA. In prac-
tice, this means that CBA proponents have no means of evaluating the 
desirability of different market or policy outcomes, other than to ex-
amine whether or not the given set of fixed individual preferences are 
being satisfied in the most efficient manner possible. Under this ap-
proach, then, preferences may be maximized (assuming away the 
conceptual and methodological problems already discussed), but they 
cannot be scrutinized. 
There is a nearly tautological aspect to this approach-what is 
good for the individual is what she chooses and what she chooses is 
what is good for her-and a deeper problem as well. The deeper 
problem is that the neoclassical economic project, as exemplified by 
CBA, excludes from consideration the very feature that many phi-
losophers identifY as uniquely constitutive of humanity. That is, what 
distinguishes us from other animals and makes us distinctly human is 
not the ability to satisfy our goals, but the ability to reason and delib-
erate about the content of those goals. Indeed, the very project of life 
might be said to consist of shaping, revising, and reflecting on one's 
137 See supra Part II.C. 
138 Tribe, supra note 43, at 97. 
139 See supra text accompanying nores 88-105 (describing risk-wage premium method-
ology that assumes wages and occupational hazard rates reflect the individual welfare-
maximizing choices of workers, rather than the confluence of a variety of additional 
influences and constraints on worker welfare-maximization). 
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goals or, put differently, on what one wants to want. 140 A final concern 
with CBA, then, is that the methodology seems ill-suited to grapple 
with this central project of life. 
In very simplistic terms, CBA asks whether diverting resources 
from curren t patterns of production and consumption toward climate 
change mitigation would produce a net enhancement of social wel-
fare. The benefits of mitigation-avoided human deaths, preservation 
of ecosystems, survival of other species, and so on-are compared to 
the opportunity cost of whatever utility would have been provided by 
the foregone combustion of fossil fuels. The reference case for 
defining and measuring utility in this process remains unequivocally 
focused on the status quo pattern of production and consumption. 
No allowance therefore is made for the possibility of individuals to 
adapt their preferences in light of changed circumstances, to ac-
knowledge the moral responsibility created by climate change, to ac-
cept as being well and just any newly imposed constraints on their 
harmful activities, or simply to get on with the project of life by deriv-
ing utility in new but not necessarily inferior ways. In short, no allow-
ance is made for the possibility of individuals to groW.141 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in con-
trast utilizes a scenario-based approach in its important consensus re-
ports regarding the causes, consequences, and policy implications of 
climate change.142 That is, it develops a set of richly described future 
courses of development that humanity might take in order to con-
sider the ecological and socioeconomic ramifications of each. As the 
IPCC notes, this approach, 
140 Cf. Harry G. Frankfmt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 15 
(1971) ("[T] he statemen t that a person enjoys freedom of the will means ... that he is free 
to want what he wants to want. "). 
141 Economist Kenneth Boulding wryly commented on this aspect of neoclassical eco-
nomics in his presidential address to the American Economic Association: 
One of the most peculiar illusions of economists is a doctrine that might 
be called the Immaculate Conception of the Indifference Curve, that is, that 
tastes are simply given, and we cannot inquire into the process by which they 
are formed. This doctrine is literally "for the birds," whose tastes are largely 
created for them by their genetic structures. and can therefore be treated as a 
constant in the dynamics of bird societies. 
Kenneth E. Boulding, Economics as a Moral Science, 59 AM. Eco. REV. 1, 1-2 (1969). . 
142 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REpORT ON EMISSIONS 
SCENARIOS (2000), available at http://www.grida.no/c1imate/ipcc/emission/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2004). 
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assists in the understanding of possible future developments 
of complex systems. Some systems, those that are well under-
stood and for which complete information is available, can be 
modeled with some certainty ... and their future states pre-
dicted. However, many physical and social systems are poorly 
understood, and information on the relevant variables is so 
incomplete that they can be appreciated only through intui-
tion and are best communicated by images and stories.143 
Thus, unlike a system of comprehensive rationality, which by its na-
ture must hold some importan t variables constan t in order to avoid 
generating inconsistent results, the IPCC's multiple scenarios ap-
proach enables inspection of the full range of determinants of the 
climate change problem. Moreover, each of the scenarios is based on 
scientifically credible assumptions and is designed to include parame-
ters that are internally consistent within individual scenarios.144 Thus, 
at least theoretically, each scenario represents a future that actually is 
possible for humanity to achieve, given emergence of the requisite 
social, economic, and political forces. 
The IPCC's scenario-based approach is preferable to CBA in the 
climate change context precisely because it provides a foundation for 
discussing what we want to want. As Tribe observed, 
the whole point of personal or social choice in many situa-
tions is not to implement a given system of values in the light 
of the perceived facts, but rather to define, and sometimes 
deliberately to reshape, the values-and hence the identity-
of the individual or community that is engaged in the proc-
ess of choosing.145 
Questions of that nature depend not on cost-benefit balancing, but 
rather on the will of the global community to conceive of and to realize 
a transformation of culture toward some shared ideal. At presen t, like 
most important aspects of the climate change problem, it is uncertain 
whether such a transformation can occur in the face of CBA's contrary 
but analytically powerful affirmation of the status quo. As Speth argues, 
however, "[w]e must hope that the answer is yes, for contrary to the 
143 [d. at ch. 1.2. 
144 See id. 
145 Tribe, supra note 43, at 99. 
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conventional perspective, it is business as usual that is utopian, whereas 
creating a new consciousness is a pragmatic necessity. "146 
CONCLUSION 
Red Sky at Morning begins with a recounting of Gus Speth's expe-
rience serving on President Carter's Council on Environmental Qual-
ity and helping to draft one of the first significant reports to identifY 
the problem of climate change for a broad political and public audi-
ence.147 In his foreword to the report, issued in 1981, Speth urged his 
readers to consider the problem one of immediate and serious global 
import, not only for the sake of the presently living, but also for the 
sake of other generations and other forms of life: 
One imperative we share is to protect the integrity of our 
fragile craft and the security of its passengers for the dura-
tion of our voyage. With our limited knowledge of its work-
ings, we should not experiment with its great systems in a 
way that imposes unknown and potentially large risks on fu-
ture generations. In particular, we cannot presume that, in 
order to decide whether to proceed with the carbon dioxide 
experiment, we can accurately assess the long-term costs and 
benefits of unprecedented changes in global climate. 
Whatever the consequences of the carbon dioxide ex-
periment for humanity over the long term, our duty to exer-
cise a conserving and protecting restraint extends as well to 
the community of life-animal and plant-that evolved here 
with us. There are limits beyond which we should not go in 
disrupting or changing this community of life, which, after 
all, we did not create. Although our dominion over the earth 
may be nearly absolute, our right to exercise it is not. l4S 
This passage, and the failure of the global community to heed its 
words over the past two decades, illustrate well the pitfalls of aspiring 
to comprehensive rationality within a context as vast and polycentric 
as global climate change policymaking. CBA, by its very design, is ill-
equipped to grapple with deep scientific uncertainty, to reliably value 
human life and respect the existence of other beings, to assess and 
146 SPETH, supra note 1, at 196. 
147 See id. at 1. 
148 [d. at 5 (quoting U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALI'IY, GLOBAL ENERGY FUTURES AND 
THE CARBON DIOXIDE PROBLEM, at viii (1981)), 
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honor the needs and rights of future generations, or to contemplate, 
discu~s, and pursue as-yet-unrealized ways and modes of living. With-
out these capabilities, CBA offers only meager assistance to climate 
change policymaking. 
